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been increasing: in this sense, there might be a link running from income
distribution to market structure, consistent with the observed data.
Two …nal points should be noticed: …rst, we treat income polarisation as
an exogenous shock; secondly, we do not take into account possible income
increases. Exogeneity of the income distribution is consistent with our partial
equilibrium approach, in the sense that we assume away any feedback e¤ects
from market concentration to aggregate income distribution. As far as the
second point is concerned, in the real world income polarization has been
associated with increases in average income; however, we abstract from the
latter and focus on mean-preserving shocks to income distribution, in order
to sort out the e¤ects of purely distributive changes.
The outline of the paper is as follows: section 2 presents the basics of the
model; section 3 performs comparative statics exercises, taking into account
the e¤ects of income polarisation; comments and conclusions are gathered in
section 4.
2 The basic model
We consider, in turn, (i) the demand side, describing the income distribution,
the optimal decision of consumers, and the resulting market demand function;
(ii) the optimal decision of symmetric …rms in an oligopoly setting à la
Cournot.
2.1 Income distribution and demand
We model the demand side of the market as a continuum of consumers,
each of whom is identi…ed by the income y he is endowed with.The latter is
continuously distributed as F : [ymin; ymax] ! [0; 1] over some support such
that 0 · ymin < ymax. The only assumptions we impose on F (apart from
di¤erentiability) are that (a) the density f(y; µ) = @F (y; µ)=@y is unimodal;
(b) it is subject to mean preserving shocks – i.e., if we take a real parameter
µ as a mean preserving spread, an increase in µ translates itself into the
distribution f (¢; µ) being more dispersed around the given mean.3 If we
denote the interior mode by m 2 (ymin; ymax), we can write formally (a) and
(b) as the following properties:
3Using a mean preserving spread amounts to ranking equal-mean distributions by
second-order stochastic dominance. It is well known that such ranking is equivalent to
Lorenz dominance: µ is thus an inequality index satisfying the Pigou-Dalton’s “principle
of transfers” (Atkinson, 1970).
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These properties yield a useful result, summarized in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 1 If µ is a mean preserving spread of the distribution F (y; µ),
then:
(i) there exists a value by 2 (ymin; ymax) such that @F (y;µ)@µ ¸ 0 for all y 2
(ymin; by), with strict inequality somewhere;
(ii) there exists a value y < by such that @f(y;µ)
@µ
¸ 0 for all y 2 (ymin; y), with
strict inequality somewhere.
Proof. For ease of notation, let G(y; µ) ´ @F (y;µ)
@µ
. Then the following
holds: (1) G(ymin; µ) = G(ymax; µ) = 0, which follows from µ not altering
the distribution’s range; (2) 9by such that G(y; µ) ¸ 0 for all y < by, withby > ymin and strict inequality somewhere, since by the de…nition of mean
preserving spread (property (b)) the integral cannot be negative around ymin:
This proves claim (i); (3) G(y; µ) < 0 for some y > by, by the same property,
as the integral function is zero around ymax. All of this implies that G(y; µ)
crosses zero at least once in the interior of [ymin; ymax], the …rst time at by
from above. Hence G exhibits a local maximum y, between ymin and by:
There follows that @G(y;µ)
@y
¸ 0 for all y 2 (ymin; y) (with strict inequality
somewhere). Then claim (ii) follows trivially, since by Young’s theorem on
cross derivatives @G(y;µ)
@y
= @f(y;µ)
@µ
:
The basic idea is illustrated by the following …gure, where the simple
case of single crossing of the distribution is described (it should however be
stressed that we do not impose single crossing): there is a value y such that
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for all y · y both the density and the distribution are raised by an increase
of the mean preserving spread µ. Notice that y might not be arbitrarily close
to ymin, as is apparent from Figure 1.4
G
y
Figure 1: The function G
We assume that any given consumer buys one unit of the commodity
whenever its price p is lower than his ‘income’ y – which of course amounts
to interpreting y as the consumer’s reservation price.5 If one normalizes to
unity the total population, market demand is then simply
Q(p; µ) = 1¡ F (p; µ) (1)
the (positive) elasticity of which can straightforwardly be derived as ´(p; µ) =
pf(p; µ)=[1¡ F (p; µ)].
2.2 The Cournot equilibrium
The supply side of the model is described by a symmetric Cournot setup,
with non-decreasing marginal and average variable costs, and non-negative
…xed costs. Assume then that the market is served by n identical …rms, and
let C(qi), i = 1; :::; n, denote variable costs and CM(qi) = C(qi)=qi average
variable costs: we have C 0(qi) ¸ CM(qi) ¸ 0, and C 00(qi) ¸ 0 for qi ¸ 0. We
also assume C 0(0) 2 [ymin; ymax).
4Consider e.g. a symmetric Beta distribution f(y; µ) = yµ(1 ¡ y)µ=B(µ), with µ > 0,
y 2 [0; 1] and B(µ) = R 10 yµ(1¡ y)µdy. Then a decrease in µ is a mean preserving spread
in the distribution, and µ = 1 (quadratic distribution) yields y »= 0:253 – that is, around
the 25th percentile of the distribution.
5This is clearly the most direct way to link reservation prices to income. Since we are as-
suming no speci…c functional form for income distribution, our argument only requires that
a unimodal income distribution generates a unimodal distribution of reservation prices,
and that a wider spread in income distribution be mirrored into a wider spread of the
distribution of reservation prices.
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Given the market demand function (1), …rm i maximizes its pro…ts. In
this setting it is easier to solve the Cournot model in prices along the lines
suggested, e.g., by Kreps (1990, ch.10). This entails that the individual
demand curve faced by …rm i may be written as
qi(pi; p¡i; µ) = 1¡ F (pi; µ)¡
X
j 6=i
qj(pj; p¡j; µ)
where p¡i = fpjgj 6=i. The function to be maximized is
¼i(pi; p¡i;K; µ) = qi(pi; p¡i; µ)pi ¡ C(qi(pi; p¡i; µ))¡K (2)
where K ¸ 0 denotes …xed costs, and the Cournot conjecture entertained by
…rm i is @qj=@pi = 0. Firm i’s …rst order condition for pro…t maximization
is
@¼i
@pi
= 1¡ F (pi; µ)¡ [pi ¡ C 0(¢)]f(pi; µ)¡
X
j 6=i
qj = 0
Invoking symmetry, pi = pj = p for all i; j = 1; :::; n, and henceX
j 6=i
qj =
n¡1
n
(1¡ F (p; µ)),
we obtain that in equilibrium
@¼i
@pi jpi=p
= 1
n
(1¡ F (p; µ))¡ [p¡ C 0(¢)]f(p; µ) = 0 (3)
which of course amounts to the familiar Cournot condition (1 ¡ 1
´n
)p = C 0.
Equation (3) solves for the sought-for short-run equilibrium price p¤(n; µ).
Dropping the i subscript, the corresponding equilibrium pro…t of the
generic …rm is
¼e = 1
n
(1¡ F (p¤; µ)) p¤ ¡ C ¡ 1
n
(1¡ F (p¤; µ))¢¡K (4)
Clearly, the equilibrium number of …rms n¤ is detemined by the zero pro…t
condition ¼e = 0, which yields an implicit function n¤(K; µ).6 In the Ap-
pendix we show that, given our assumptions on costs and demand, one such
equilibrium exists and exhibits the (standard) properties summarized in the
following:
6We treat n as a continuous variable, following a well established practice (e.g., Mankiw
and Whinston, 1986).
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Proposition 2 Consider the normalized demand curve Q(p; µ) = 1¡F (p; µ),
where F (p; µ) is a unimodal income distribution and µ a mean preserving
spread. Assume that (i) average variable costs C(q)=q are nondecreasing in
q; (ii) marginal costs C 0(¢) are non-decreasing in q and such that ymin ·
C 0(0) < ymax. Then (a) the symmetric equilibrium price p¤(n; µ) obtained
from (3) is monotonically decreasing in n, that is dp
¤
dn
< 0; and (b) the long
run Cournot equilibrium price p¤(K; µ) = p¤(n¤(K; µ); µ) decreases monoton-
ically to its perfect competition level as K tends to zero, that is dp
¤
dK
> 0 and
limK!0 p¤(K; µ) = limK!0 p¤(n¤(K; µ); µ) = C 0(0).
Property (a) is known as ‘quasi-competitiveness’: it refers to industry
output increasing as n increases. It should be noticed that property (b)
(monotonic convergence to the competitive equilibrium) is not necessarily
implied by the …rst (e.g., Ru¢n, 1971).
3 Income distribution and the number of …rms
The behaviour of the function n¤(K; µ) will tell us how the long-run equi-
librium number of …rms adjusts to changes in demand brought about by
variations in µ, i.e. by mean-preserving increases in income dispersion. One
can approach this problem by totally di¤erentiating the zero pro…t condition.
This gives
@¼e
@p
µ
dp¤
dn
dn+
dp¤
dµ
dµ
¶
+
@¼e
@n
dn+
@¼e
@µ
dµ = 0 (5)
Notice that the …rst term is not nil - that is, one cannot take advantage of
the envelope theorem, since the …rm does not maximize pro…t as de…ned by
(4). There is an obvious externality involved, due to oligopolistic interaction:
@¼e=@p as derived from (4) is di¤erent from @¼i=@pi as de…ned in (3). The
latter is clearly nil, while the former is not – indeed it is positive for n > 1,
precisely because we know that @¼i=@pi = 0: by comparing the two, it is
easily checked that there is a factor 1=n of di¤erence, such that the two
collapse to the same (nil) value for n = 1 under monopoly, or under perfect
competition as n tends to in…nity - in both cases there is no externality.7
This being said, we are able to derive the paper’s main result, to the
e¤ect that, if the …xed cost K is su¢ciently low, shifting the mass of incomes
towards the tails of the distribution always decreases the equilibrium number
of …rms surviving in the long-run.
7This is shown formally in the proof of Proposition 3, below.
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